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Lost in operationalisation:  
Developing legally relevant indicators, questions and benchmarks 
The main purpose of this paper is to provide methodological guidance to students and 
researchers conducting quantitative studies on the realisation (outcome) of human 
rights law. The paper focuses on the grey area between law and sociology. How to 
ensure a high score on legal relevance in quantitative socio-legal studies on the 
realisation of human rights law. To discuss, this two disciplinary traditions are merged 
– sociology of law and human rights research on indicators and benchmarks. A key 
tool for making legally relevant questions in surveys are indicators. Benchmarks are 
also important for some provisions to determine if an obligation has been fulfilled by 
the State. The process of translating the law to indicators, questions and benchmarks is 
called operationalisation. Each operationalisation process must aim for a high score on 
legal relevance and it should be transparent and open to criticism. To first spend a lot 
of time and money on surveys and data collection, and then to miss the law one is 
pretending to measuring is not just embarrassing, but hazardous to the protection of 
human rights, because people then have a tendency to rationalize and present 
alternative facts about the law. 
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1. Introduction 
Dr. Martin Luther King wrote in 1967 that:  
 
The ubiquitous discrimination in his daily life tells him that laws on paper, no matter how 
imposing their terms, will not guarantee that he will live in ‘the masterpiece of 
civilization’. […] Laws that affect the whole population – draft laws, income-tax laws – 
manage to work even though they may be unpopular; but laws passed for Negro’s benefit 
are so widely unenforced that it is a mockery to call them laws.1 
 
Usually, it is the most marginalised members of society that suffer from a lack of real legal 
protection. A law that does not work is like a banknote without value. To bridge the gap 
between law on paper and ‘living law’ one needs to develop good socio-legal methods to 
study the impact of law.2 Statistical research data on the realization of a number of human 
rights laws is a human right in itself. Article 31 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disability (CRPD) asserts that States Parties must: ‘[…] undertake to collect 
appropriate information, including statistical and research data, to enable them to 
formulate and implement policies to give effect to the present Convention.’  The Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CtESCR)3 and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CtRC)4 have both asserted that States should adopt indicators and benchmarks to 
measure quantitatively the effects of the conventions within their jurisdiction.5  
 
1.1 Research Question 
In 2008, Hans-Otto Sano and Hatla Thelle made a statistical analysis of all the references in 
the journals Human Rights Quarterly and Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights between 
2005 and 2007. In their study, they revealed significant gaps in terms of the research 
material included in the articles. They concluded that:  
 
It appears that on average 46% of the sources for scholarly articles in the quoted journals 
during these three years were respectively organisational reports, administrative or legal 
documents while on average 45% of the references quoted were secondary literature. The 
remaining references (9%) were almost equally distributed between quasi-legal and 
internet sources. Virtually none fall into our category of quantitative or qualitative data. 6 
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Only 0.1 % of the references in 2005 and 2007 could be categorised as “quantitative data”, 
which included a ‘staggering’ three references.7  In 2006 there were no references at all in 
this category. As for qualitative data there were four references in 2005 (0.2%), in 2006 
there were two references (0.1 %) and in 2007 there was leap to 1.5% meaning 26 
qualitative references.8  This was ten years ago, and things have changed since then.  
In an article summing up human rights research, Fond Coomans, Fred Grünfeld and 
Menno T. Kamminga claimed that there is a lack of methodological rigour in human rights 
research, and that researchers tend more often to be activists than scholarly.  They were not 
very optimistic about the future, and concluded that:  
 
Unfortunately genuine, high quality interdisciplinary research is rare because few 
researchers are fully qualified in more than one discipline. In our view, it is generally best 
for researchers to work within their own disciplines and not to moonlight in other 
domains.9 
 
This is a rather pessimistic conclusion, and given the fact that quantitative research on the 
realization of human rights are a human rights obligation, researchers should step up and try 
to ‘moonlight’ across disciplinary boundaries. This article is about how to do that, while 
maintaining high quality legal relevance at every step of the way. 
The main question of this article is: How do we ensure a high score on legal 
relevance (validity) in quantitative studies on the realisation (outcome) of human rights 
law? A key tool for bridging the gap between the law and the questions is the development 
of indicators. An indicator, as defined in this paper, is supposed to be tool to measure the 
law – an operationalisation (translation) of the law.  I am mainly concerned about the 
development of outcome indicators, meaning indicators on the actual manifestation of the 
law for individuals and groups.10 Based on the indicators, one can develop survey questions. 
In addition, there is the question of how to determine the minimum score (result) on 
indicators and questions to make a judgment on whether a State has fulfilled its obligations:  
namely, how to develop benchmarks. 
The process of translating law into indicators, questions and benchmarks is called the 
operationalisation of the law. The text of the law is operationalised to measurable 
indicators; the indicators are operationalised to questions; and, based on these questions, one 
can operationalise benchmarks. See the illustration below: 
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The Law  Indicator  Questions  Benchmarks  
 
At each stage of the operationalisation-process, there is a danger of making mistakes, and 
one moves further and further away from the text of the law. So how do we ensure the 
highest score on legal relevance at each step – in the operationalisation of indicators, the 
questions we ask and the benchmarks we set, based on the human rights law we claim to be 
measuring?  
 The main purpose of this paper is to provide methodological guidance (or at least a 
contribution to the discussion of this) to students and researchers conducting quantitative 
studies on the realisation (outcome) of human rights law. The paper focuses on the ‘grey’ 
area between law and sociology: it is concerned with how that gap can be bridged. Once the 
crossover has been made, students and researchers may then refer to the vast literature on 
sociological methodology. I will also provide some criticism on the lack of diligence of 
international organisations and colleagues in how they reason around the operationalisation 
of indicators, questions and benchmarks.  
1.2 Human Rights Focus 
What human rights laws are most relevant for a quantitative socio-legal study concerning 
their realisation? For some human rights provisions, quantitative studies are necessary to 
determine if a government has met its obligations of results. 11 
In my Ph.D., I tried to find out if Norwegian children learn what they are supposed to 
according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) article 29 (1).12 This is a 
provision on the content of education, and I wanted to know if the provision had been 
fulfilled in Norway. Since different children have different capacities for learning, it was 
essential to collect statistical outcome data to find out if a sufficient proportion of children, 
at a certain level (9th grade), had actually learned the minimum required under the 
convention. Before I could start to collect data, and to design surveys for children and 
teachers, I had to establish (legally) what the children were supposed to learn. To set 
benchmarks, I had to determine what should be expected, at a minimum level, for the CRC 
article 29 (1) to be realized. If 90 percent of the children after nine years of education cannot 
read or write, then obviously the quality of education, defined by its minimum standards in 
CRC article 29 (1), has not been realised. However, where should one draw the line?  
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 There are many other human rights provisions that would require similar research in 
order to determine if the law has been fulfilled. For instance, the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) article 5 (b) provides that 
governments shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that:  
 
Family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and 
the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and 
development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the 
primordial consideration in all cases.  
 
So - how large should the proportion of families be that are able to express the proper 
minimum understanding required? What is an acceptable result? At what level is it safe to 
say that the convention has not been fulfilled?  
 Then, there are provisions in which one can determine a violation on a case-to-case 
basis, but one might suspect that a large proportion of the affected group does not have the 
resources to claim those rights. If statistics show that the law is not working for many 
people, it becomes clear that the State should actively do more to fulfil it. Many aspects of 
the discussions in this paper will be relevant for studies on this latter category of human 
rights studies, but as a whole the paper will be most relevant for provisions in which the 
outcome of quantitative studies are necessary to determine if the state has met its obligations 
of results.  
 
1.3 Scientific Platform 
This paper will be based on the merging of two disciplinary traditions: 1. the branch within 
sociology of law focused on the study of the effects of laws; and, 2. the discussion on human 
rights indicators and benchmarks. The discourse within the sociology of law concerning the 
study of the effects of laws has mainly been concentrated on domestic legislation, and has 
largely been separate from the debate about human rights indicators and benchmarks. I will 
start by introducing the sociology of law, before I start talking about indicators and 
benchmarks.  
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2. Sociology of Law 
According to Thomas Mathiesen, the sociology of law concerns itself with the description or 
analysis of the law in society.13 Some say that the sociology of law is a branch of sociology; 
that is to say, the branch of sociology that is occupied with legal issues.14 Others say that the 
sociology of law is part of the discipline of law.15 Still others have argued that the sociology 
of law must find its own autonomous identity, detached from the disciplines of both law and 
sociology.16 Kristian Andenæs asserts that we should not put ourselves in a position in 
which the disciplines determine our research questions: ‘It is the real questions, the real 
problems of humanity that should determine our approaches and methods – not the other 
way around.’17 The sociology of law is a science dedicated to the study of questions that fall 
in-between law and sociology - pure and simple.  
2.1 The Study of The Housemaid Act  
One of the classic studies of sociology of law was published in 1952. Wilhelm Aubert, 
Torstein Eckhoff and Knut Sveri published a study on the realization of the Norwegian 
Housemaid Act.18 A central aim of the study was not to simply study the realization of the 
Norwegian Housemaid Act; they wanted to say something general about how to study the 
effects of laws. 19 The study was ground-breaking, at least in Scandinavia, and has inspired 
many other studies.20 However, not many scholars have discussed its methodological 
approach and importance. 
 In this study, a key methodological challenge was, according to the authors: ‘[T]o 
decompose the complicated and accurate information we needed (since the law is detailed 
and complicated as most laws) in short and simple questions that the interviewer and 
interviewee could master.’ 21 However, although they identified this key challenge, they did 
not really provide any tangible solutions. Instead, they said that:  
 
We were largely looking for information on the actual conditions and often knew exactly 
which properties this information should have. It should primarily cover all the 
characteristics that determine whether there is any breach of the law or not.22 
 
How could they just know this? Where did this intuitive knowledge come from? According 
to the authors the questions of their survey was based on the “text of the law” (The 
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Housemaid Act).23 However, sometimes one has to actively interpret the law, and not just 
rely on intuition.  
 In the end, despite the fact that Aubert, Eckhoff and Sveri wanted to say something 
general about how to study the effects of laws, it seems they did not have a plan, and nor did 
they even discuss the need for one. According to Jørgen-Dalberg Larsen, the lack of general 
theories on how to study the effects of laws is a significant problem within the sociology of 
law.24  
 
3. Making a Plan 
How do we best approach bridging the gap between the law and the questions we ask in 
surveys and interviews? Firstly, it is essential to get all the factors ‘on the table’. The most 
common mistake is to start constructing questions before the law has been sufficiently 
analysed and defined, and before the necessary decisions on the selection of informants and 
the methods of how to collect the data have been taken. It is hard to break free from a 
detailed starting point. According to Gustav Haraldsen: ‘Those who start making questions 
will easily stick to formulations whether they cover the research question or not. Such 
surveys will easily become messy because the questions are not based on an overall plan.’25  
 
3.1 Evaluation Models 
How does one make a plan? In 1997, Sidsel Sverdrup wrote a Ph.D. in which she criticised 
existing sociology of law studies for lacking theories on methodological models in studies 
about the effects of laws. She suggested three models on how to evaluate laws.26 
Subsequently, she refined and reiterated these models in her latest book on evaluations: the 
legal evaluation model, the target group model and the context based model.27 
The legal evaluation model is an evaluation model based on the analysis of legal 
complaints and legal cases. The downside to this is that, in many situations, the number of 
cases is not necessarily that high.28 One might also argue that those who complain to courts 
and legal institutions are often amongst the most resourceful within society, and not the 
most marginalised. 
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The context based evaluation model focuses on informants not directly affected by 
the law, but indirectly affected. In this model, one tries to collect data on the framework 
conditions of the law.29 
The target group evaluation model is focused on the target groups affected by the 
law. Based on indicators, one collects data through interviews, surveys and/or observations 
from those directly affected by the law. 30  
The target group model and the context-based model are the most relevant for a study 
on the realization of those human rights provisions, which is the focus of this paper.31 When 
undertaking a survey, one might wish to compare information from different perspectives, 
meaning that one puts more or less the same question to different informants (both the target 
groups and those indirectly affected by the law). This is called triangulation.32 Michael Evans 
explained that:  
 
[...] based on the principle of confirming findings through the use of multiple 
perspectives. The key aspect of the strategy is threats to the validity of the conclusions, 
caused by the particular biases of any one source, method or agent of research, and which 
will be lessened by employing a variety of type. […] The converging perspectives will 
arguably make the findings more powerful.33 
 
Although the models of Sidsel Sverdrup address certain aspects of where to collect 
information about the law, they do not include much on how to make sure that the questions 
asked of the target group or other informants are as legally relevant as possible.  
Todd Landman and Edzia Carvalho (2010) considered four measurement models of 
human rights: events-based measures, standard-based measures, survey-based measures and 
socio-economic and administrative statistics. 34 For the purpose of this paper, Survey-based 
measures are the most relevant. 35 Survey-based measures are, according to Landman and 
Carvalho, based on collecting information from a large sample of individuals (usually 
randomly selected) who answer predefined questions about either their perception of human 
rights or their experiences of human rights within their country.36 I am not sure why 
Landman and Carvalho seemed to think that surveys on the realization of human rights must 
be about the perception or experiences of human rights. People in general do not necessarily 
know much about human rights law, and are thus not necessarily able to say anything 
meaningful about it.37 Landman and Carvalho included a short discussion on the 
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development of indicators as tools to operationalise human rights to questions in the 
surveys. 38 
Indicators, the questions based on them, and benchmarks, should have a high score 
on legal relevance (validity). Before I start to talk about indicators, I will, therefore, first 
address the importance of legal relevance (validity).  
 
4. Validity/ Legal Relevance  
The difference between the actual values of the law, and the operationalised values, is called 
the measurement error margin. 39  In order to increase validity, one must make sure that the 
measurement error margin is as low as possible. If one regards human rights as legal 
provisions of law the indicators, questions and benchmarks must be as legally relevant as 
possible. Notice that I do not say legally “valid”. It is difficult to talk about “legal validity” 
in this context, since that is a concept of law that indicates the enforceability of a law. For a 
law to become a legal law, it has to be legally valid. 40  Thus, not to confuse, one should talk 
about making indicators legally relevant. 
Investing time, money and energy on conducting surveys, only to find out 
subsequently that the questions were off-target, is a disaster. What might happen then is that 
instead of admitting that one is off-target, those who have a vested interest in the data start 
pretending that the law is different. The indicators and benchmarks might then take a 
normative life of their own, reshaping its “parent” norm.41 Terence Halliday emphasise that:  
 
Indicators themselves are permeated by the exercise of power—in their creation, their 
propagation, and their impact. If social indicators are the creatures of social scientists, 
they must also be subject to the same sorts of scrutiny they purport to exemplify.42 
 
Halliday argues that an implicit, and sometimes explicit, epistemological tension among 
professions within international financial institutions impels their legal departments to 
diagnose national legal systems with technologies drawn more from the social sciences and 
finance than law.43 Indicators are supposed to measure the law, not to hijack and change it.  
Malcolm Langford and Sakiko Fukuda-Parr (2012) identifies validity44 as the 
“Achilles heel” of indicators, asserting that: 
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The first (challenge) is the definition and choice of indicators – construct validity. The 
very strengths of quantification – simplification and abstraction in applying a single 
measurable definition across different contexts – are its Achilles heel. The criteria for 
creating an indicator may not match the relevant human rights standard.45  
 
Landman and Carvalho discuss a few aspects of survey design, stating that:  
 
Any questions that probe an individual’s experience or perception of human rights needs 
to pay attention to significant questions of validity. First, does the question (or questions) 
have what is called ‘face validity’, which is to say, does the question adequately capture 
the meaning of the particular human right ‘on the face of it’? Second, does the question 
(or questions) have content validity, where all dimensions of the human right are covered 
by the questions? Third, does the question (or questions) achieve internal validity, where 
responses across batteries of related questions on the human right are logically 
consistent? Finally, does the question (or questions) provide for external validity, where 
responses simply appear to contradict other known information about the respondent? 46 
 
I do not agree with the premise of this argument - i.e., that a survey on the measurement of 
the realization of human rights need to address the ‘experience or perception of human 
rights’.47 However, we must strive for surveys to have high scores on face validity, content 
validity, internal validity and external validity. Landman and Carvalho talked about the 
concept of human rights in general, but they did not offer any advice on how to develop 
indicators, benchmarks and questions that can protect and ensure a high score on legal 
relevance.48  
 
4.1 What is Human Rights Law? 
As mentioned, this paper is not on the realization of the concept of human rights in all its 
possible meanings. I am only concerned about the realization of human rights as law. What 
is human rights law? That is ultimately a question of legal methodology and jurisprudence.  
Todd Landman claimed that: ‘Rights in practice are those rights actually enjoyed and 
exercised by groups and individuals regardless of the formal commitments made by 
governments.’ 49  He seemed to be suggesting that some rights exist beyond political 
agreements and commitments; and, further, that these are the “real” rights. Eugene Ehrlich 
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(1862-1922) was one of the founding fathers of the sociology of law. He talked about the 
“living law”, which is ‘[…] the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been 
posited in legal propositions’.50 However, if this were the case, what would be the 
difference between legal norms and other norms, and how would the norms of one group 
affect the norms held dear in other associations?51 In my experience, as one who has worked 
on indigenous peoples rights for many years, human rights violations often occur because a 
large proportion of the majority regard their own norms as more important than the legal 
norms of human rights conventions. Minority and indigenous peoples’ legal rights are 
ignored, distorted or successfully opposed, partly because the voices of the minorities are 
drowned, ignored or rendered insignificant in the public debate by the majority – because 
they are not seen as being important. Issues, on the other hand, involving minorities or 
indigenous peoples doing something perceived to be violating the norms of the majority are 
given massive attention. Thus, I do not regard the rationality of human beings to be 
trustworthy in questions of rights, morals and justice. According to Gordon Allport:  
 
Open-mindedness is considered to be a virtue. But strictly speaking, it cannot occur. A 
new experience must be redacted into old categories. We cannot handle each event 
freshly in its own right. 52 
Hans-Georg Gadamer argued that:  
 
Is not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways? If 
this is true, the idea of an absolute reason is not a possibility for historical humanity. Reason 
exist for us only in concrete, historical terms – i.e., it is not its own master but remains 
constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates.53  
 
Even Immanuel Kant admitted that actions based on a purely rational good will, free from 
self-love (inclinations), are rare things, ‘which the world has perhaps so far given no 
example’.54 
One of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical debates of jurisprudence is 
whether there is a difference between law and justice. Are human rights laws inherently 
just? Natural law perspectives are inclined to “find” justice in law, suggesting that theories 
of justice should guide the interpretation of law. Legal positivists would argue that laws are 
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man-made, and that in order to understand the law, one must distinguish between what ‘is’ 
and what ‘ought to be’.55 
As I do not trust the rationality of human beings, I find it important to cling to the 
technical rigidity of interpreting valid legal sources. Thus, I am a legal positivist. As I see it, 
conventions are contracts between the States. The law is what the contracting parties define 
it to be. Human rights laws are man-made political compromises, in an unfair world (here, 
“unfair” is defined according to my own subjective norms, which have nothing to do with 
the law). Human rights law is not based on the highest moral principles of morality; it is the 
set of agreements left when the negotiations are over: the compromises of a broken world. 
The road to hell is paved with good intentions – that is why nations choose to cling to this 
compromised “lesser” peace. The alternative is an international “State of Nature”.56   
In a socio-legal study on the effects of law, the main purpose is rarely to discuss 
legal methodology as such. Adopting a controversial approach to legal interpretation is thus 
counter-productive. To ensure a high score on legal relevance in indicators, questions and 
benchmarks, one should adopt an approach to the law that is the most likely to prevail in 
court. In most courts, adopting a legal positivist approach is the safest. Legal positivism is 
the legal canon, and any explicit deviation from it would likely be met with the criticism of 
judicial activism. As the legal canon, and the method socially expected and legitimately 
justified, positivism would be the safest choice to avoid methodological criticism in most 
countries.57 I am not saying that legal positivism is the only approach to human rights law, 
but if one wants to question it and argue the case for a natural law theory, then that should 
be done separately. In order to increase legal relevance, one should adopt the safest possible 
approach to the law. 
5. Indicators, Questions and Benchmarks 
Indicators are key tools to ensure a high score on legal relevance in the survey questions. 
Human rights indicators can be defined as: ‘[A] piece of information used in measuring the 
extent to which a legal right is being fulfilled or enjoyed in a given situation.’58 This 
approximates what I mean when I talk about indicators in this paper.59 For the purpose of 
this paper, I will define it more specifically as: A legal conclusion about what to measure in 
order to say that a legal right is fulfilled in a given context.  
Why do I define human rights indicators as legal conclusions? Because, in this paper, 
I am concerned about how to ensure legal relevance in studies of human rights as law. I do 
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not focus on human rights as political instruments or moral guidelines; I do not focus on 
Sustainable Development Goals or human development indexes. I am interested purely in 
the study of human rights as legal commitments made by legislative bodies. In many 
countries, a range of human rights commitments are treated merely as political or moral 
guidelines, but often enough, legislators do make commitments to certain human rights 
obligations by either incorporating or transforming conventions into law. Then it is up to the 
executive branch to realize those commitments, and it is our job as researchers to test the 
successfulness of those efforts. In this paper, I am strictly interested in such studies, 
measuring the effectiveness of the government in delivering on legislative commitments 
made by the legislator. The legal analysis of human rights as law, in the sense of 
commitments made by the legislators, must include both an analysis of the domestic law, 
meaning determining the strength of the commitments, and an analysis of the content of 
those commitments, which (unless we are talking about domestic human rights provisions) 
must involve the interpretation of international law.  
 Most of the literature on human rights indicators is not concerned about 
human rights as law; at least, not in the sense of legal commitments made by legislators. 
However, if one is concerned with measuring the realisation of human rights commitments 
as law, then indicators, as tools for measuring these legal commitments, must be as legally 
relevant (valid) as possible.60 Thus, human rights indicators (as I define them) are legal 
conclusions that must be justified by legal arguments. The legal analysis behind the 
operationalisation and justification of the indicators should also be transparent, and open to 
criticism. They should not just appear ‘magically’, as if out of thin air. In addition, there is 
the question of judiciability.61  
In 2003, the UN Special rapporteur on the Right to Health, Paul Hunt, proposed a 
conceptual framework for using and creating indicators in relation to the right to health.62 
The framework is based on three types of indicators – structural-, process- and outcome 
indicators. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) later adopted 
this framework in a general project on human rights indicators.63  
The structural indicators capture the commitment of the State. They reflect the legal 
instruments and existence of basic institutional mechanisms deemed necessary for 
facilitating the realization of a human right.64 Notice that in addition to the legal weight and 
nature of the commitment, it includes institutions - for instance, the existence of a National 
Human Rights Institution that has a mandate in conformity with the Paris Principles.65 
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Process indicators measure the processes by which the laws are implemented and 
realized – the duty bearers’ (government’s) ongoing efforts to transform their commitments 
into the desired results. They measure the willingness of States to realise human rights 
commitments, the degree to which activities that are necessary to attain the objectives of the 
law are carried out, and the progress of those activities over time.66  
Outcome indicators measure the capacity of states to deliver results. They are 
designed to capture data on the actual enjoyment of human rights for individuals and 
groups.67  
 
5.1 SMART-Criteria 
It is often asserted that indicators should be SMART. It is mentioned so often that I feel 
compelled to address it. The letters of SMART can mean different things. In general, 
SMART often means something like this:  
 
S: Specific or significant 
M: Measurable  
A: Attainable or acceptable 
R: Relevant or realistic 
T: Time-framed or trackable 
 
Not all of these quality criteria on indicators are that useful for a study on the realization of a 
convention. Indicators are used as tools to plan and evaluate development projects. Criteria 
such as attainable and realistic are only relevant for such project-indicators. If one strip 
away this irrelevant noise around the SMART-criteria, we end up with three main criteria: 
specific, measurable and valid (relevant).68 In addition to these, Andersen and Sano (2006) 
discussed a range of other criteria.69 The most relevant one is that indicators should be 
focused on target groups. In order to conduct a sociological study, one must define who to 
get information from (i.e., the informants). They might be defined as the target group. 
Another way of approaching this is to say that the target groups are those directly affected 
by the law or the right holders. As mentioned above, that is not necessarily an absolute 
criterion; one might instead collect information from those indirectly affected by the law.70 
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It might also be helpful to narrow the study to some specific geographical regions, and 
maybe to a specific target group within that region.  
Based on this, an indicator that is relevant for socio-legal studies on the realisation of 
human rights law is a concrete, measurable and legally relevant conclusions that identifies a 
specific group of informants within a defined geographical area.  
5.2 Reddy Made Global Indicators  
UNHCR has produced a list of general human rights indicators. 71 A range of other 
organisations has done the same thing. UNICEF has developed one of the best lists of global 
indicators. They have produced a handbook on the interpretation and implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the handbook, a whole chapter is dedicated 
to each of the articles in the convention. At the end of each of these chapters, there are lists 
of indicators.72 The question therefore arises: how useful are these general global indicators?  
Katarina Tomaševski argued that:  
 
Applying the same standard of performance to all countries as if all had identical 
infrastructures, institutions and resources is not only unfair to those countries where a 
national human rights system has yet to be developed, but it also disregards one of the 
main targets of international cooperation in the area of human rights, namely to promote 
human rights. 73  
 
One should make indicators as relevant to the context as possible; only then will they be 
legally relevant. However, an even bigger problem is that the legal analysis of these global 
indicators is not visible. Although UNICEF provides a legal analysis of each of the articles 
of the CRC, and ties the indicators to that legal analysis (which is why I say they are one of 
the best) they do not provide a legal justification for each of the indicators. They do not 
discuss the legal relevance of the indicators at all. They are simply listed at the end of each 
chapter, as if they were a natural conclusion to the general legal analysis. 74 The OHCHR is 
even more general, and there is practically no legal justification for the indicators proposed 
at all.75  
As mentioned, indicators should be regarded as legal conclusions: 76 they are 
instruments of power, and the operationalisation of them should be transparent and open to 
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discussion. 77 Any legal conclusion must be justified by legal arguments and those 
arguments should be presented and discussed openly. 
 
5.3 Survey Questions 
In theory, survey-questions are developed on the basis of the indicators that one has 
operationalised from the law; in other words, the questions are operationalised from the 
indicators. The indicators can function as sociological research questions, and one might feel 
tempted to ignore the law at this point, focusing only on the indicators. This would be a 
mistake. To a certain extent, each operationalisation process is like solving a Rubik’s Cube – 
once you have one part finished, you have to mix up everything in order to get the second 
part correct. It is not quite as frustrating as a Rubik’s Cube, but in order to secure a high 
score on legal relevance, one must at least keep an eye at the legal analysis behind the 
indicator.  
 A sensible tradition within quantitative research is that surveys build on each other. 
A good survey contains questions similar to previous surveys, so that the results of one 
survey can be analysed in comparison to those obtained in previous surveys.78 If one is 
developing a survey together with a quantitative scholar, they will certainly want to design 
the survey in relation to other studies. Thus, sometimes one ends up in a discussion about 
what is most important. If legal relevance is the primary aim of the questions, then questions 
of former surveys poses a dangerous temptation. It is indeed convenient if some questions in 
other surveys can be regarded as legally relevant, but one should make sure to justify them 
in relation to one of the operationalised indicators.  
 Some questions will be more legally relevant, and therefore fit better to the indicator 
and the law. In order to maintain a high score on legal relevance, one should discuss the 
relevance of each question. This might become a question of space, but one might at least 
consider discussing the legal relevance of some of the questions that does not have an 
intuitive and obvious legal relevance to the indicator and the law.   
 In addition to questions about the actual realisation of the law, it often natural to also 
include other context based questions that can say something about the realisation of the 
law. This might include for instance knowledge about the law. 79 
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5.4 Benchmarks 
Having made outcome indicators and questions one come to this question: what should be 
the minimum score/result on the indicators to determine that a State has fulfilled its 
commitments? That is the benchmark. As indicated earlier, the CtESCR and the CtRC have 
emphasised that states should adopt benchmarks in relation to each national indicator.80 
However, for instance in the report of Canada, indicators are mentioned - but not 
benchmarks - and the indicators are not justified by any legal analysis.81 Benchmarks should 
also be justified in relation to the law, and the arguments should be transparent and open to 
criticism. 
It is very difficult to arrive at any accurate benchmark for outcome indicators. Often 
there are quite different views on the law and to arrive at a measurable minimum score, 
representing a violation of the covenant, is quite a challenge.82 Benchmarks are based on the 
numbers (data) one can expect from the questions of surveys. At this stage, the text of the 
law is operationalised (translated) for the third time. The text of the law is operationalised to 
measurable indicators; the indicators are operationalised to questions, and based on the 
questions one are supposed to draft legally relevant benchmarks.  
The operationalisation of benchmarks must also be analysed in the light of the legal 
discussions on progressive realisation and minimum core rights.83 The CtESCR have 
adopted “scoping”, which involves the joint consideration by the State and the Committee of 
national benchmarks, which will provide the targets to be achieved during the next reporting 
period.84 If the State and the Committee have agreed on a benchmark, one might say that 
this constitutes a commitment by the State - hence, a law. One might then use that 
benchmark, or the principal arguments involved in setting that benchmark in order to find a 
benchmark. To be more or less sure to hit the law, one might simply adopt the same 
indicators and benchmarks that have already been agreed by the State and the Committee. 
However, the point of doing studies on human rights must be, at least sometimes, to put a 
focus on issues ignored by the State and the Committees. If the benchmark is set low enough 
and embedded in strong legally relevant arguments, the political leadership might feel 
ashamed to challenge it. After all, the politics of shame and blame might be the most salient 
feature of the power of human rights.85 
Although the benchmarks should be drafted after the questions, the benchmark score 
does not need to be based on each individual question. Answers from different questions can 
be added together to give a sum-score on an indicator. When I did my Ph.D., one of my 
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indicators was formulated approximately like this: ‘Pupils in ninth grade must have learned 
to respect the rights of the Sámi people.’86 That is quite a broad indicator, and it might be 
criticised for not being particularly easy to measure. However, one has to make indicators 
based on the law, and those indicators must be as legally relevant as possible. In relation to 
attitude indicators (as in the example) one could construct an additive index (a Likert scale) 
based on the responses from number of different questions. One might try to set a 
benchmark in relation to that index.87 One of the questions could be formulated 
approximately like this in relation to the example indicator: ‘On a scale from 1-10 how 
much do you agree with this statement: The Sámi people are too demanding in their fight for 
rights.’88 Adding up the score from different similar statements could give an overall score 
on the indicator (Pupils in ninth grade must have learned to respect the rights of the Sámi 
people). But then again, where should the benchmark be set? What score must be attained in 
order to say that pupils in ninth grade have learned enough respect for the rights of the Sámi 
people? What score must be attained in order to say that the CRC article 29 (1) (b) has been 
fulfilled? If we say (as in the example) that 1 represents positive attitudes towards Sámi 
rights and 10 represents negative attitudes one might, for example, say that the minimum 
average score must at least be 5.  
 
5.5 ‘Should’ and ‘Must’ Assessments 
One should, as a general rule, try to be as careful as possible in undertaking legal analysis.89 
However, it is hard to stick to rock-solid legal conclusions in all aspects of the law when 
making indicators. Sometimes one can make a case that a State “should” meet the standards 
reflected in an indicator or benchmark, but one cannot say that the State “must” meet them. 
If one can justify the indicator by strong conclusive legal arguments, one can make a “must-
indicator”. For instance, based on CRC article 29 (1), one could say that “the majority of 9th 
grade students must be able to read and write”.  
If, for example, a UN treaty body has expressed an opinion once or twice in 
concluding observations or in general comments, one can make a “should-indicator” based 
on that opinion, but one cannot say that a State is legally bound it, because the statements of 
the UN treaty bodies are not legally binding.90  
 The same goes for benchmarks. When setting the benchmarks, based on the 
indicators, one should be even more careful because they are drafted at the third 
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operationalisation level, after the questions.91 Thus, the benchmarks should sometimes be 
formulated as “should-benchmarks” in relation to “must-indicators”.  
6. Summary Steps to Reach a High Score on Legal Relevance 
So to sum up, which steps are necessary to maintain legal relevance (validity) in socio-legal 
studies about the quantitative realisation of human rights?  Todd Landman proposed four 
levels for bridging the gap between the concept of human rights and indicators.92 These are:  
 
(1) Background concept: the broad constellation of meanings and understandings 
associated with a given concept.  
(2) Systematized concept: a process of specifying specific right.  
(3) Operationalising the indicators: where decisions are made as to what type of measure 
that is to be used, and how this measure captures “the positive and negative 
dimensions” of the rights that it measures 
(4) Scores on indicators: the scores for units of observations (e.g. individuals, countries, 
regions) generated by a particular indicator – quantitative and qualitative data.   
 
I agree somewhat with the basic order that Landman sketches. However, Landman did not 
elaborate on these levels, and he did not seem to be concerned about human rights as law – 
at least, not from a positivist legal perspective.93  
I would suggest the following 10 steps for looking at the whole picture of conducting a 
survey on the realization (outcome) of a human rights law in a country: 
(1) General analysis of the law  
(2) Clarifying the judiciability of provisions:  
(3) Focus analysis  
(4) Clarifying the legal weight of the legal sources used in the analysis 
(5) Drafting (operationalising) indicators 
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(6) Drafting questions 
(7) Doing a pilot survey 
(8) Drafting benchmarks  
(9) Collecting the data 
(10)  Analysing the data and make conclusions in relation to the benchmarks.  
6.1 General Analysis of the Law 
First, one needs to get an overview of the legal landscape that one wants to study. That 
might include what Landman talked about in his first level (background concept). Even if 
one has decided to focus on one specific human rights provision, it is important to view that 
provision in the context of the other laws that are part of the convention and other relevant 
provisions in other conventions and declarations.  
6.2 Clarifying the Judiciability of Provisions 
Which of the provisions in the legal landscape are self-executing, and legally valid and 
enforceable laws? Some human rights provision is too expansive to be judicial; for instance, 
CESCR article 12 on “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.” In general, it would be difficult to claim that a State 
has violated CESCR article 12 if you became sick. The provision is formulated more as a 
political aspiration than an enforceable law, which could be legally valid in court. Malcolm 
Langford discusses these expansive provisions in his dissertation on social rights (pp. 128-
132). 94 So why clarify the judiciability of a human rights provision? Because if the 
provision is not enforceable in court, it has no legal significance. One might then criticize 
the lawmakers (parliament) for their lack of action in clarifying and consolidating their 
commitment, but it is meaningless to conduct a time-consuming socio-legal study on the 
realisation of such a provision, when in fact it is not a legally valid law. In order to achieve a 
high score on legal relevance, one must make sure that one is actually studying the law, and 
not something else.  
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6.3 Focus Analysis 
After the more general analysis of the legal landscape, one must choose to focus the legal 
analysis on one or two provisions, choosing a target group (sampling) and defining the 
geographical scope of the study. This may be compared to the second level referred to by 
Landman (systematized concept) (however, I would add that one must start thinking about 
sampling the target group and the geography of the survey to this concept). The legal 
analysis, at this stage, is about clarifying what the rights/law mean in practice for specific 
individuals and groups that are the subjects for the study. Why do I say that one should 
focus on one or two provisions, and not a whole convention? Because if one is interested in 
a high score on legal relevance, one must have space to conduct a diligent and detailed 
analysis of the law. This stage lays the legal foundation for the drafting of indicators, 
questions and benchmarks. If the legal analysis is shallow, it will weaken the legal relevance 
of the indicators, questions and benchmarks.  
6.4 The Legal Weight of the Legal Sources  
What is the legal weight and legal validity of the legal sources used in the analysis of the 
law? For instance, general comments are not legally binding; however, if the Supreme Court 
has endorsed them as weighty legal documents, and if the treaty-body has repeated the same 
argument many times in concluding observations and other general comments, and if other 
committees and declarations supported those general comment one might argue that it is a 
weighty legal source. An explanation of legal sources in general might be conducted in a 
separate chapter; however, one must also justify and explain the use of legal sources as part 
of the legal analysis, especially when one comes to the assessment of the legal weight of the 
indicators, questions and benchmarks.  
6.5 Drafting (operationalising) Indicators  
Based on the focus analysis (step 3) one starts to operationalise (translate) the legal 
conclusions into specific, measurable and target specific indicators. One thing is to consider 
the different aspects of a provision in relation to a target group within a geographically 
defined area, but at this stage one must gather the perspectives and arrive at some 
conclusions about what to measure. It is like writing a judgment. After having presented the 
perspectives of each of the parties, the judge addresses all the necessary and relevant 
questions in the case, making conclusions along the way, and then the conclusions are 
Hadi Strømmen Lile 
 
Published in International Journal of Human Rights, 2017: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1336384 
23 
summed up and clarified. What must be there for the law to be fulfilled or enjoyed for the 
target group? One should take care to make the indicators as measurable as possible, at the 
same time one must regard the indicators as legal conclusions, meaning that each indicator 
must be justified by strong legal arguments.  
 As the indicators are legal conclusions, one should justify each indicator with legal 
arguments. Not all legal conclusions can be rock-solid and immune to criticism. Thus, to 
discuss and be open about the weaknesses and strengths of each of the indicators is 
important to maintain a high score on legal relevance. Thus, one should assess the legal 
relevance and legal weight of the indicators. 95  
6.6 Drafting Questions 
Having drafted the indicators, one can then start to draft questions. The questions must be 
relevant (valid) in relation to the indicators, but to maintain legal rigour one should, as 
mentioned, keep an eye on the legal analysis of the law and not just rely on the indicator.96 
Some questions are going to have a stronger legal relevance than others do. In order to 
increase transparency and a high score on legal relevance, one should clarify and discuss the 
legal relevance and legal weight of each question, or at least some of the questions or groups 
of questions.97 
6.7 Pilot Survey  
Different people, age groups and cultures understand words differently. Formulations may 
seem logical in one's own head, but others might understand them differently. Some 
questions might also be seen as inappropriate. There are so many ways of getting it wrong. 
To conduct a pilot survey and to do some interviews to find out how the survey has been 
understood is thus very important.  
6.8 Drafting Benchmarks  
Having finished drafting indicators and questions, one can then start drafting benchmarks, 
and not before. The benchmarks must be based on the data one can expect from the 
questions. What should be the minimum score/result on the indicators and questions to 
indicate that a State has fulfilled its obligations? Again, as mentioned, to increase 
transparency and a high score on legal relevance, one should clarify and discuss the legal 
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relevance and legal weight of each benchmark. I find this to be very difficult, because at this 
stage, the text of the law is operationalised (translated) for the third time.98 
6.9 Collecting the Data  
There are numerous articles and books on how to conduct surveys; hence, I will not go into 
such issues. As a general rule, one should try to make sure that the data-collection process is 
as reliable as possible, and one must try to get a response rate that is as high as possible.  
6.10 Analysing the Data  
A general approach in quantitative research is to analyse the strength of the findings via 
conducting statistical analyses (and there are numerous books on this approach). However, 
in a socio-legal study on the realisation of the law, the primary aim is to find out if the law 
has been fulfilled. Have the conduct the government reaped the necessary results? Have the 
obligation of results been met? If one have managed to draft benchmarks (that are legally 
relevant) the analysis of the results can be compared and discussed in relation to these 
benchmarks. If one has not managed to draft any benchmarks, one can discuss the results in 
relation to the law more generally, perhaps without drawing any conclusions about 
violations of the law. Even if it is not possible to determine if the law has been violated, the 
data can give important information about the realisation of the law. This is especially true 
for studies on human rights laws, in which the violation of the law is determined on a case-
to-case basis.  
6.11 General Reflections on the Steps 
The scope of this article does not permit me to go into detail about all these steps. In reality, 
one will jump a little bit back and forth between them. For instance, as one starts to draft the 
indicators, or the questions, one might realise that the legal analysis needs to be adjusted. 
The same thing might happen after having conducted a pilot survey. However, although one 
might go back and adjust certain parts, one should follow the basic order, and not (for 
example) start drafting benchmarks before the law has been analysed, and the indicators 
have been drafted.  
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7. Concluding Summary Remarks 
I began this paper by contemplating the following primary research question: How do we 
ensure a high score on legal relevance (validity) in quantitative studies on the realisation 
(outcome) of human rights law?  
 In addressing this question, I presented a review of the literature on the sociology of 
law, mostly from a Scandinavian perspective because that is what I know best. There seems 
to be a lack of general theories on how to study the effects of laws. One of those who have 
developed general theories on this is Sidsel Sverdrup.99 She sketched out different models 
for evaluating laws. The most relevant model for answering my research question is the 
target group model. However, she did not contemplate a theory on how to ensure legal 
relevance in surveys. Todd Landman and Edzia Carvalho (2010) had a similar model, 
talking about survey-based models. 100 They also included the use of indicators as a tool to 
develop surveys.  
 I used the concept “legal relevance” instead of validity, because the concept “legal 
validity” has a very different meaning within law. It refers to the enforceability of a law. 
Todd Landman and Edzia Carvalho (2010) did refer to the importance of ensuring validity 
in indicators; however, they did not really develop any theory on how to ensure that the 
indicators are legally relevant. Todd Landman seemed to be adopting a natural law 
perspective on human rights. 101 I rejected that, and argued instead for the importance of 
adopting a legal positivist approach to the law.  
 I then argued that in order for indicators to function as legally relevant tools for the 
development of surveys, they must be regarded as legal conclusions about what to measure 
in order to say that a legal right is fulfilled in a given context. Then the legal analysis behind 
the operationalisation of the indicators should be transparent and open to criticism. For the 
sake of diligence, the legal weight and strength of the legal arguments should be discussed. 
Sadly, most of the studies, reports and literature on indicators have not justified the 
indicators with legal arguments. This is also a question of the legitimacy of power and rule 
of law. Indicators might take normative life of their own, reshaping its parent law, and thus 
undermining the law.  
 Survey questions are operationalised based on the indicators. However, for the sake 
of diligence, one should keep an eye on the legal analysis behind the indicators. Some 
questions are going to be more legally relevant than other questions. Thus, the most diligent 
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students would discuss the legal justification for each question, or at least groups of 
questions.  
 Having constructed questions, one can then start to develop (operationalise) 
benchmarks. They are the minimum scores/results on the indicators to be attained on order 
to determine whether a State has fulfilled its commitments. As for indicators and questions, 
the legal justifications behind benchmarks must be justified and discussed. In doing so, one 
must address the issue of minimum core rights. At this level, the law is operationalised for 
the third time, making it a very difficult legal task.  
 Lastly, I take a step back sketching a picture of the whole study, based on my 
primary research question. I suggest 10 steps, starting with a general analysis of the law and 
ending with the analysis of the data in relation to the benchmarks.  
 In this paper, I have focused strictly on the question of legal relevance in the foggy 
woods in-between law and sociology. To ensure validity and reliability in general from a 
sociological perspective, once the law has been operationalised, one can read a plethora of 
books on sociological methodology.  
 To sum up in the simplest of terms: indicators, questions and benchmarks are legal 
conclusions. They should be diligently justified by legal arguments every step of the way. 
The legal strength and weight of the indicators, questions and benchmarks should also be 
determined and discussed. It becomes more difficult at each level of operationalisation along 
the way, as one moves further and further away from the text of the law. The indicators, 
questions and the benchmarks should reflect that uncertainty. Sometimes one can say that a 
State “should” achieve a certain level of result in a survey (a should-benchmark), but one 
cannot make the argument that if the results fall below that level the State has, as an 
indisputable fact, failed to fulfil the convention (a must-benchmark).   
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